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TAKING THE GAAR TOO FAR: AN ANALYSIS OF
MCNICHOL v. THE QUEEN
TIMOTHY R. HUGHESt

The decision of the Tax Court of Canada in McNichol v. The
Queen 1 represents the first instance in which the General AntiAvoidance Rule (the "GAAR"), in section 245 of the Income Tax
Act, 2 has been judicially applied. The impugned transaction was a
classic example of dividend or "surplus" stripping, which involves
the removal of tax paid net profit from a corporation as capital
rather than by a distribution of dividends. There are specific antiavoidance measures within the Act which purport to deal with
surplus stripping transactions. The Court, however, chose not to
utilize such purpose-built provisions, but relied instead on the
expansive ambit of the GAAR.
This note will comment on the McNichol decision by first
providing a brief outline of the facts, undertaking an analysis of the
transaction under the specific subsection 84(2) anti-avoidance
provision and, finally commenting on the Court's application of the
GAAR. The conclusion of this note is that the presence of specific
anti-avoidance rules should preclude the application of the GAAR.
This view finds support in previous decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada, and is consistent with the dear intent of Parliament. In
the result, the Court's decision to disallow the transaction in
McNichol is appropriate, but should have been achieved pursuant to
subsection 84(2), a provision particular to the type of transaction at
issue, instead of under the section 245 GAAR.

t B. Mus. (Queens), LLB. anticipated 1998 (Dalhousie). The author wishes to
thank H. Leslie O'Brien, Edwin C. Harris and Hemant K Tilak for their
assistance and encouragement.
I [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2088.
2 R.S.C. 1985, c.l (5th Supp.) [hereinafter the Act]. All statutory references in this
paper are to the Act.
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I. THE FACTS
In the McNichol case, the appellants were the only shareholders of
Bee Holding Corporation ("Bee"). Bee held an office building as its
sole asset, portions of which were leased to a law firm in which the
appellants were partners. When their relationship within the firm
began to sour, and the firm changed premises, the appellants took
measures to dissolve Bee and distribute profits. With the aid of a
professional tax adviser, a series of steps were carried out to effect
this result. The complete transaction is illustrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 1

®

shares
$300,000

BEC

I

net assets of BEC
after transaction
(including tax
refund) $348,723

BEFORMAC

0

LOAN
$300,000

G) c'5h }uilding
BANK
SIX-44 MAIN INC.
bank loan repaid
with assets of BEC
First, the building owned by Bee was sold to Six-44 Main Inc.,
the owner of the new building in which the law firm was to be
located in late January 1989 (Step 1 in Fig. 1). After the sale, the
only asset held by Bee was cash, and there was no intention on the
part of the estranged partners to continue to operate the
corporation as a going concern. His Honour Judge Bonner found
... that the completion in January of 1989 of the sale of
Bee's building marked the end of its rental business. By
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then relationships among the appellants had deteriorated
to such an extent that there was no prospect whatever
that Bee would commence any new business. 3

In distributing the assets of Bee, the taxpayers could have
caused the corporation to declare dividends. Such dividends would
have been taxable in the hands of the taxpayers at their full
marginal rates. As a corollary, this method of distribution would
also have generated a dividend tax refund for Bee under section
129. The taxpayers chose, however, to attempt to secure the assets
of the company as capital through a sale of all Bee shares to
Beformac Holdings Limited ("Beformac") (Step 2 in Fig. 1).
Forestall, the president of Beformac, was a client of one of the
taxpayers.
Beformac could not afford to make the purchase with existing
funds, so financing from the Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce (the "Bank") was obtained. The loan was secured with
the assets of Bee by appointing Forestall as the sole director and
officer of Bee and furnishing him with the company seal
immediately before the closing of the transaction. Although the
bank manager described this as "somewhat unusual", he felt that
the Bank's position was sufficiently secure and recommended that
the funds be advanced. 4 The sale of the shares was completed on
March 29, 1989 (Step 3 in Fig. 1), and the loan was repaid with the
assets of Bee after amalgamation with Beformac on April 21, 1989
(Step 4 in Fig. 1) .
The taxpayers received $75,000 each as a result of the
transaction and declared the money as income resulting from a
disposition of capital property on their respective 1989 tax returns.
By utilizing the then applicable subsection 110.6(3) capital gains
exemption, two of the taxpayers effectively sheltered the entire
amount of the money derived as a result of the transaction, and the
others paid only a nominal amount of tax. Revenue Canada
reassessed their returns, declaring the amount received as a taxable
dividend. The GAAR was used as the only tool of reassessment. The
taxpayers appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, where the Minister
invoked subsection 84(2) and section 84.1 as additional bases for
3 Supra note
4

Ibid.

1 at 2094.
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taxing the amounts received in an amendment to the Reply filed in
the proceedings. This note will not address the Court's approach to
the section 84.1 argument put forward by the Minister, as it was
dealt with in a conventional and, with respect, appropriate fashion.
The subsection 84(2) argument requires critical discussion, and will
be considered in the following section.

II. THE SUBSECTION 84(2) ANALYSIS
It is my position that the GAAR should not have been applied in the
McNichol case. There are a sufficient number of specific provisions
in the Act to deal with surplus stripping schemes two of which are
section 84.1 and subsection 84(2), the sections invoked as
additional reasons for denying the transactions in Revenue
Canada's amendments to the Reply filed in the McNichol
proceedings. The use of the rule was unnecessarily detrimental to
the taxpayers involved, and is likely to have far-reaching policy
ramifications to its future application.
With respect, the only provision which should have been used
on these facts is subsection 84(2). The Minister realized the
applicability of this subsection only after proceedings were under
way; Judge Bonner, however, rejected it outright. Perhaps Revenue
Canada's approach can be attributed to a desire to apply the new
GAAR rule to a "can't lose" situation. The Court's decision, as will
be explained, is difficult to reconcile as it is not supported by
precedent or policy. Subsection 84(2) reads as follows:
Where funds or property of a corporation resident in
Canada have at any time after March 31, 1977 been
distributed or otherwise appropriated in any manner
whatsoever to or for the benefit of shareholders of any
class of shares in its capital stock, on the winding-up,
discontinuance or reorganization of its business, the
corporation shall be deemed to have paid at that time a
dividend on the shares of that class equal to the amount,
if any, by which,
(a) the amount or value of the funds or property
distributed or appropriated, as the case may be, exceeds
(b) the amount, if any, by which the paid-up capital
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in respect of the shares of that class is reduced on the
distribution or appropriation, as the case may be,
and a dividend shall be deemed to have been received at
that time by each person who held any of the issued
shares at that time equal to that proportion of the
amount of the excess that the number of the shares of
that class held by the person immediately before that
time is of the number of the issued shares of that class
outstanding immediately before that time.

It can hardly be said that the normative transaction to which the
situation in McNichol should be equated is not the "winding-up" or
"discontinuance" of Bee. As discussed above, the only asset held by
the company was cash, and none of the shareholders had any
intention of continuing to operate the business. A transfer of cash
effected through a surplus stripping transaction such as that found
in McNichol is captured within the ambit of subsection 84(2) as
"funds ... distributed or otherwise appropriated in any manner
whatsoever." The effect of subsection 84(2) on such transactions is
best explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Smythe v.

M.NR. 5
Judge Bonner, however, dismissed the Smythe case out of hand,
notwithstanding the similarity between its facts and the fact
situation in McNichol. In the judgment he states, "[i]t is not
necessary to delve into the complexities of the transaction in
Smythe. "6 Figure 2 outlines the "complexities" of the transaction in
that case which, as can be seen, are virtually on all fours with the
series of transactions in McNichol.

5 [1969]
6 Supra

C.T.C. 558 (S.C.C.).
note 1 at 2099-2100.
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Fig. 2
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The taxpayers in Smythe were the three shareholders of C.
Smythe Ltd. who, for the tax reasons discussed above, wished to
effect a distribution of income from that company as capital, not
dividends. On December 15, 1961 the assets of the company were
sold to a second company, C. Smythe for Sand Ltd., leaving cash
as the only asset left in C. Smythe Ltd. (Step 1 in Fig. 2). The
shares of C. Smythe Ltd. were to be purchased by F.H. Cameron
Ltd. and Dabne Enterprises Ltd. (two related companies, as
opposed to the single purchaser in
On December 28th,
1961, a bank loan was obtained by the purchasing companies from
the Bank of Montreal, secured by promissory notes (Step 2 in Fig.
2). The transfer of the shares was also carried out on December 28,
1961 when the taxpayers resigned as directors and officers of C.
Smythe Ltd. and handed the company seal, records and share
capital over to the purchasing companies (Step 3 in Fig. 2). The
assets of C. Smythe Ltd. were used by the purchasing companies to
repay the loans made by the Bank of Montreal on January 2, 1962.
Judson ]. (for the Court) found that subsection 81 (1) [now
subsection 84(2)] was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, saying:
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It is unnecessary to appeal to any other section of the Act.
This section covers specifically the case before us. 7
In finding that the section applied to the fact situation, he
determined that the true essence of the transaction was a windingup or discontinuance of C. Smythe Ltd. That there were no
formalities associated with the dissolution of the company was of
no consequence to his Lordship's finding that the normative
transaction was indeed a winding-up:
I would hold that there was a winding-up and a
discontinuance of the business of the old company,
although it is apparent that there was no formal
liquidation under the Winding-up Act or the winding-up
provisions of the Ontario Companies Act. 8
This finding was reinforced by reference to Merritt v. MNR.,
where Maclean P. stated:
I entertain no difficulty over the construction to be given
or
the
words
"winding-up'',
"discontinuance"
"reorganization," as used in s.19 [a predecessor to
subsection 84(2)] of the Act. In construing these words,
we must look at the substance and form of what was
done here .... There was no "winding-up" of the Security
Company by a liquidation, but there was in fact, I think,
a winding-up of the business of that company and I think
the word "winding-up" may be given that meaning here,
although I need not definitely so decide because, in any
event, there was a "discontinuance" of the business, and
whether that was brought about by a sale ... or
amalgamation ... is, in my opinion, immaterial. ... What
was done with the business fell somewhere within the
meaning and spirit of those words.9
Although the transactions in Smythe and McNichol are identical
in all material respects, Judge Bonner decided that there are four
grounds on which Smythe may be distinguished. I will deal with
these in turn.
7

8
9

Supra note 5.
Ibid at 563.
[1941] Ex. C.R. 175 at 181.
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First, when comparing the Smythe case, Judge Bonner puts
forward the view that:
The [Supreme Court of Canada in Smythe] described
the steps taken as "artificial transactions" and stated that
their purpose was to distribute or appropriate to the
shareholders the undistributed income of the old
company .... In my opinion Smythe is not analogous to
the present case. I am unable to discover any basis on
which the sale by the appellants of the Bee shares can be
described as "artificial." 10

Once the assets of the original companies in both transactions
were liquidated, both groups of shareholders had as their purpose
the distribution or appropriation of the income of these companies.
In both cases the taxpayers had expert tax advice which enabled
them to devise schemes by which the form of the transaction was
far different from its substance. The "artificial" nature of the
McNichol transaction seems readily apparent. The purchaser was
made sole director and officer of the company he was purchasing
immediately before the transaction in order to facilitate the sale.
Bee had no assets other than cash, and no prospects for carrying on
future business of any kind. The substance of the transaction in
McNichol was a winding-up of Bee. Any method by which this end
was achieved that could not be seen as being prima facie a windingup is "artificial" in the same way that the transactions in Smythe
were found to be artificial.
Judge Bonner provided a second ground on which Smythe was
distinguishable from the facts in McNichol:
By reason of the form of the transaction the appellants
did not, in the end, receive any property which at any
time belonged to Bee. Bee retained its property and
carried it forward into the amalgamated company. I
reiterate that it cannot be said that Bee's property was
distributed or otherwise appropriated to the appellants
"in any manner whatever." 11

10
11

Supra note 1 at 2100.
Ibid.
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If the payment to the shareholders being made from borrowed
money is an important factor in holding that the transaction in the
McNichol case is not a winding-up, then it seems the Court is
contradicting the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Smythe. In that judgment, Judson ]. quoted the following passage
from Merritt v. M.N.R. with approval:
It is immaterial, in my opinion, that the consideration
received by the appellant for her shares happened to
reach her directly from the [purchaser] or the [wound-up
company]. 12
However, during the course of his GAAR analysis later in the
judgment, Judge Bonner compounds the problematic nature of his
decision on this point when he finds that Bee's undistributed
income was paid out to the taxpayers. In this context he writes:
"Bee's surplus was, at the very least, indirectly used to fund the
price paid to the appellants for their shares." 13 Clearly, the money
cannot be said to have come from one place for the purpose of a
subsection 84(2) analysis and from another when a GAAR test is
applied.
Third, a timing element is introduced into the subsection 84(2)
discussion in the McNichol judgment. Judge Bonner suggests that
"because Bee retained its property for some time after the purchase
price was paid to the appellants" the reasoning from Merritt as
regards the distribution of property from Bee is somehow
inapplicable to a subsection 84(2) analysis. 14 The time between the
transfer of the shares and the repayment of the loan was twentythree days, all of which were within the personal taxation years of
the appellants. This contrasts with the five day time lag in Smythe
which straddled the 1961-1962 taxation years. Notwithstanding
that the money used to make the payment in Smythe was repaid in
1962, the Exchequer Court reassessed the returns of the taxpayers
for the year 1961. 15 This suggests that the time at which the loan is
repaid is not determinative of when the winding-up is deemed to
Supra note 9.
Supra note 1 at 2110.
14 Ibid. at 2099.
15 Smythev. MNR. (1967), 67 D.T.C. 5334 (Ex. Ct.) at 5339.
12

13
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have occurred. Surely there is no significant difference between a
twenty-three day period and a five day period. There is a certain
amount of absurdity in suggesting that all a taxpayer need do to
defeat subsection 84(2) is maintain the assets of the purchased
company in a bank account for 23 days before disposing of them.
Additionally, the fact that the assets of Bee were used as security
for the loan rendered them subject to the in rem rights of the Bank
as soon as the loan was advanced. The funds were in fact used to
repay the loan, and were thus subject to control by the Bank for the
entire twenty-three days.
The fact that Bee's assets were used as security for the loan is
also material to countering the fourth and final argument put
forward by the Court in McNichol for denying the application of
subsection 84(2). The judgment suggests that:
The respondent's characterization of the transaction as
something other than a sale of shares rests in part on the
premise that the appellants participated in or in some
way were responsible for the events which followed the
share sale. 16
According to the Supreme Court of Canada's analysis in

Smythe, what happens after the share sale is immaterial; this is, with
respect, the better position. The McNichol argument can be
addressed when it is recalled that the security held by the Bank in
the form of the Bee assets was only available because the taxpayers
effected what was, in the words of the bank manager, a "somewhat
unusual" transaction. It seems unlikely that the taxpayers did not
know exactly what would happen after Beformac used the loan to
purchase the shares: the security would be used to pay the loan. In
any event, as noted above, what a purchaser does with the actual
assets of a company after buying shares is not, by the reasoning of
Judson J. in Smythe, material to determining the time of windingup for the purposes of deeming a dividend payment under
subsection 84(2).
The subsection 84(2) argument should have been sufficient to
dispose of the appeal in McNichol. The fact that the Court found it
insufficient is unfortunate for two reasons. First, a subsection 84(2)
16

Supra note 1at2100.
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analysis would have properly entitled Bee to a dividend tax refund
by reason of section 129. This could have resulted in a greater
amount of money being distributed to the taxpayers either directly
as shareholders of Bee on wind-up, or indirectly as an increase in the
price paid by Beformac to purchase the shares of Bee from the
taxpayers. Secondly, as will be elaborated below, the application of
the GAAR by the Court does not supply clear precedent for future
use of the rule.17

Ill. THE GAAR ANALYSIS
The current version of the GAAR was introduced as an amendment
to the Act on June 30, 1988. 18 In its final form, the charging
provision of the section reads as follows:
245(2) Where a transaction is an avoidance transaction,
the tax consequences to a person shall be determined as is
reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a tax
benefit that, but for this section, would result, directly or
indirectly, from that transaction or from a senes of
transactions that includes that transaction.
Subsection
transaction":

245(3)

defines

the

meanmg

of

"avoidance

An avoidance transaction means any transaction

(a) that, but for this section, would result, directly or
indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or
arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to
obtain the tax benefit.

17 Note that in the second case in which the GAAR was judicially considered,
Bowman T.C.C.J. found subsection 84(2) to be applicable and sufficient to dispose
of a virtually identical fact situation. See RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc. et al v.
The Queen (1997), 97 D.T.C. 302.
18 Bill C-139,AnAct to amend the Income Tax Act, the Queen Pension Plan, the
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements
and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act, 1977 and
certain related Acts, 2nd Sess., 33rd Par!., 1988.
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(b) that is part of a series of transactions, which series,
but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly,
in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may reasonably be
considered to have been undertaken or arranged
primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the
tax benefit.

A "tax benefit" is defined as:
245(1) "tax benefit" means a reduction, avoidance or
deferral of tax or other amount payable under this Act or
an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under this
Act.

In other words, where a transaction results in a tax benefit in the
form of a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount
payable under the Act, and is not made primarily for bona fide
purposes other than to obtain a tax benefit, it will be considered an
avoidance transaction for the purposes of the GAAR.
The requirement in subsection 245(3) that the transaction be
made for bona fide purposes is likely a result of the rejection of the
"business purpose test" by the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Stubart case. 19 An earlier version of the GAAR proposed by the
Department of Finance was formulated to exclude any transaction
that was not made for bona fide business purposes. 20 This was
rejected in favour of the rule as currently enacted, which
incorporates the business purpose test, and is also broad enough to
capture non-business motivated transactions such as those involved
in estate planning. It should also be noted that section 245 contains
an explicit reference to "a series of transactions", which codifies the
common law "step transaction doctrine." 21
!9 In Stubart Investments v. The Queen, (1984] C.T.C. 294, the notion that a
transaction must be fueled by a business, rather than tax driven, purpose was
rejected. All of the taxpayer's dealings in Stubart were inspired solely by a desire to
shelter the income of one corporation in the losses of a related corporation. The
Court decided to "reject the proposition that a transaction may be disregarded for
tax purposes solely on the basis that it was entered into by a taxpayer without an
independent or bona fide business purpose" ibid.: at 314.
20 V. Krishna, Tax Avoidance: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (Toronto:
Carswell, 1990) at 30-31.
21 The "step transaction doctrine" has been devised by the courts to deal with
situations where single steps in a series of transactions do not offend income tax
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If the transaction is not characterized as an avoidance
transaction the rule will not be applied. If, however, an avoidance
transaction is found, subsection 245(2) provides discretion to
determine the tax consequences "as is reasonable m the
circumstances in order to deny a tax benefit." This is a generous
grant of administrative discretion.
The GAAR also contains a relieving provision in subsection
245(4):
For greater certainty, subsection (2) does not apply to a
transaction where it may reasonably be considered that
the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in a
misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse having
regard to the provisions of this Act, other than this
section, read as a whole.
It is not clear how this relieving provision, with its objective test,
operates to provide "greater certainty" to the application of
subsection 245(2). What subsection 245(4) might do, however, is
delimit a legislative version of the "object and spirit" interpretation
doctrine within the Act. 22 If the avoidance transaction cannot
legislation individually, but effect a result that runs contrary to the legislation when
the series is analyzed as a whole. Courts in the United States have developed an
approach whereby the tax consequences of a series are determined as a result of the
economic substance of the series. In the U.K., Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson,
[1984] 1 All E.R. 530 (H.L.) instructs that any transaction in a series which has been
inserted purely for tax reasons may be ignored when determining the nature of the
combined steps-in effect applying a business purpose test to each step.
22 Traditionally, income tax provisions were interpreted according to their
literal meaning, without taking into account the underlying objects of the
legislation [see e.g. CIR. v. The Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. I (H.L.)J. Such a
method of interpretation is generally at odds with the principles used in the
interpretation of other statutes, where the 'object and spirit' of the legislation can
be construed as an aid to applying the provision at issue. In Stubart Investments v.
The Queen [supra note 19] the doctrine of strict interpretation was rejected in
favour of an approach which considered the 'object and spirit' of provisions of the
Income Tax Act as well as their literal meaning. This development was later
tempered by the majority judgment in Antosko v. The Queen, [1994] 2 C.T.C. 25
(S.C.C.) where Iaccobucci]. decided that the 'object and spirit' approach should be
reserved for provisions which are ambiguous, and that the literal approach to
interpretation should continue to be applied where "the words of the statute are
clear and plain."
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"reasonably be considered" to misuse either a particular section of
the Act, or "abuse" the Act as a whole, then it will not fall within the
parameters of subsection 245(2).
Figure 3 is a diagram of the rule's application.
Fig. 3
Step One: Is the transaction an
"Avoidance Transaction"?
s.245(1) -Reduction
or Avoidance or
Deferral of Tax?

I

Step Two: Does the Transaction
Offend the "Object and Spirit" Test?
s.245(4) -Does the
transaction misuse a

provision of the Act?

I

• YESe •

YES

NO

s.245(3) -Primarily for
bona fide purpose other
than to reduce tax?

s.245(4) -Does the
transaction abuse the
Act as a whole?

NO

T
NO

"'

s.245(2)
Avoidance Transaction

YES

YES

...

Do not apply s.245(2)

As noted above, the Minister used the GAAR as the sole basis for
disallowing the transaction in McNichol, and only subsequently
added subsection 84(2) and section 84.1 as alternative grounds for
rejection. The following is an analysis of the Court's application of
the GAAR in McNichol.
1. Step One: Is the Transaction an "Avoidance Transaction"?

The first step in ascertaining whether there is an "avoidance
transaction" for the purposes of subsection 245(2) is to determine
whether a "tax benefit" has accrued to the taxpayer within the
meaning of subsection 245(1). As discussed above, the definition of
"tax benefit" includes a reduction, avoidance or deferral of any
amount payable under the Act or an increase in a refund of tax or
other amount.
In McNichol, the tax benefit was found to be the "difference
between tax payable by the appellants upon receipt of the taxable
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dividends and that payable upon realization of capital gains from
the disposition of shares." 23 This result was arrived at by comparing
the transaction in which the shares were transferred to the likely
method of effecting the same result. Judge Bonner declares that a
reduction or avoidance of tax "require[s] the identification in any
given set of circumstances of a norm or standard against which
reduction is to be measured." 24 His Honour found that:
Their choice was between distribution of that
accumulated surplus by way of liquidating dividend and
sale of the shares and in choosing the latter they chose a
transaction which resulted in a tax benefit within the
s.245(1) definition. 25

The Court's suggestion that a "norm or standard" be
determined for the purposes of measuring a tax benefit appears to
be on the right track. It should be noted, however, that in
suggesting that the share transfer be compared to a liquidating
dividend the Court comes dangerously close to contradicting its
earlier subsection 84(2) analysis wherein it found that Bee was not
wound-up.
The second step in analyzing whether a transaction is an
"avoidance transaction" under subsection 245(3) is to determine
whether it was undertaken or arranged for a bona fide purpose other
than to reduce tax. The appellants argued that the primary purpose
of the transaction was to "terminate their association with each
other in the common ownership of Bee. "26 In deciding that the
appellants did not meet their burden of proof on this issue, Judge
Bonner found that, because all that was left to do was liquidate the
assets of Bee, the true purpose of the transaction was to allow the
taxpayers to take advantage of the capital gains exemption then
present in subsection 110 .6(3) of the Act.
Such an approach to determining whether a transaction is an
avoidance transaction for the purposes of subsection 245(3) is likely
over-broad. It expands the scope of subsection 245(3) to include
tax avoidance measures which are specifically authorized by the Act
Supra note 1 at 2108.
Ibid.
2s Ibid.
26 Ibid.

23
24

230

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

as tax expenditure provisions. Section 146, for example, allows for
the accumulation of tax deferred income in a registered retirement
savings plan ("RRSP"). This is clearly a tax benefit within the
meaning of subsection 245(1) as it results in the deferral of tax.
Likewise, it may be executed in the prescribed manner without
conforming to any requirement that the money be used for
retirement and, if so, would not have a bona fide primary purpose.
In applying the test set out by the Court in McNichol, a
contribution to an RRSP, and any other government sponsored
avoidance measures would be "avoidance transactions" within the
meaning of subsection 245(3).
As suggested above, the substance of the McNichol transaction
was the winding-up of Bee. It is suggested that where there is a
specific provision in the Act which will accommodate the impugned
transaction, that section should be applied instead of the GAAR.
Likewise, if the activity in issue is sanctioned by the Act, it should
not be classified as an avoidance transaction and the GAAR should
not be applied. If, and only if, the transaction is of such a character
that it is not caught by these preliminary steps, then the subsection
245(3) test should be invoked. Figure 4 represents the addition of
these steps to the flowchart from Figure 3.
Fig. 4.

Is this type of
transaction sanctioned
by the Act?

NO

'Y

Is there a specific antiavoidance provision to
.-.___de-al=w-it-h-th-is_ty_pe=o=f..a
_
transaction?

NO

i

YES

e
e

YES

STOP

STOP
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s.245(1) -Reduction
or Avoidance or
Deferral of Tax?

YES

""

s.245(3) -Primarily for
bona fide purpose other
than to reduce tax?

...

NO
s.245(2)
Avoidance Transaction

e
e

NO
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STOP
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Step Two: Does the Transaction
Offend the "Object and Spirit Test"?
s.245(4)-Does the
transaction misuse a
provision of the Act?

YES

NO
s.245(4) -Does the
transaction abuse the
Aa as a whole?

YES

•

NO

Do not apply s.245(2)

The application of the GAAR as a residual provision is consonant
with its intended use. The Explanatory Notes to Bill C-139, which
contained the new section 245, described the rule as "an important
supplement to the tools that may be used to counter abusive tax
avoidance transactions." 27 Furthermore, it states that "[t]he new rule
applies as a provision of last resort after the application of the other
provisions of the Act, including specific anti-avoidance measures." 28
There is judicial recognition of this view in the decision of
Judge Bowman in the RMM Canada Enterprises case:
If I am right in believing that sections 84 and 212 or,
alternatively, section 212.1, by themselves result in taxing
this surplus strip, recourse to section 245 is not only
unnecessary but inappropriate. The application of section
245 depends upon the existence of an "avoidance
27

Explanatory Notes to Bill C-139, An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, the
Queen Pension Plan, the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, the Federal-Provincial
Fiscal Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health
Contributions Act, 1977 and certain related Acts, 2nd Sess., 33rd Pad., 1988.
28 Ibid.
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transaction" which is a transaction that, but for this
section, would result in a tax benefit. In other words, for
section 245 to apply, the transaction has to otherwise
"work" in the sense of achieving its intended fiscal result.
Therefore section 245 is aimed at successful tax
avoidance schemes. If they do not work in any event
section 245 is unnecessary. As stated above in my
discussion of section 84, I do not think the transaction
works, quite apart from section 245. If I am wrong in
that conclusion, I must consider section 245. 29

If this approach was applied

McNichol, the
transaction would be put squarely within the domain of subsection
84(2) as a result of its classification, in substance, as a winding-up.
As discussed above, this would be consistent with the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Smythe and its affirmation of
Merritt. Judge Bonner's "standard or norm" upon which he bases
his finding that there is a tax benefit as defined in subsection
245(1), is that of a "liquidating dividend." Here the normative
transaction-a winding-up- and the professed "standard or
norm"-a liquidating dividend-are one and the same. This per se
should have led squarely to an application of subsection 84(2).
to the facts in

2. Step Two: Does the Transaction Result in a Misuse or Abuse?

As discussed above, subsection 245(4) is a relieving provision. If a
transaction does not result in a misuse of the provision at issue, or
an abuse of the Act read as a whole, subsection 245(4) deems
subsection 245(2) not to apply. Judge Bonner found the transaction
in McNichol to be a misuse of the capital gain provisions found in
sections 38 and 110.6 of the Act and an abuse of the "provisions of
the Act, read as a whole, which contemplate that distributions of
corporate property to shareholders are to be treated as income in
the hands of the shareholders." 30 Among these provisions Judge
Bonner mentions section 15 and, surprisingly, section 84. As
regards the latter, his Honour points out that:
[T]he appellants have sought to realize the economic
value of Bee's accumulated surplus by means of a
29
30

Supra note 7 at 311.
Supra note 1 at 2112.
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transaction characterized as a sale of shares giving rise to
a capital gain in preference to a distribution of a
liquidating dividend taxable under s. 84. The scheme of
the Act calls for the treatment of distributions to
shareholders of corporate property as income. The form
of such distributions is generally speaking irrelevant. 31
It seems paradoxical that a transaction which is described for
the purposes of the GAAR test to be "a classic example of surplus
stripping"3z was not also found to be a deemed dividend under
subsection 84(2). Clearly, the "form of such distributions" is
"irrelevant" in either case. It appears that it is only Judge Bonner's
tendentious approach to the GAAR that allowed it to create this
artificial distinction, supplanting long-established anti-avoidance
principles.

3. The Remedy
Because the Minister found that the transaction at issue in McNichol
was within the sole purview of the GAAR, the tax consequences to the
taxpayers were denied as was felt to be "reasonable in the
circumstances" per subsection 245(2). Subsection 245(5) was used
in recharacterizing the tax consequences of the transaction. That
provision reads as follows:
Without restricting the generality of subsection (2),
(a) any deduction in computing income, taxable income,
taxable income earned in Canada or tax payable or any
part thereof may be allowed or disallowed in whole or in
part,
(b) any such deduction, any income, loss or other
amount or part thereof maybe allocated to any person,
(c) the nature of any payment or other amount may be
recharacterized, and
(cl) the tax effects that would otherwise result from the
application of other provisions of this Act may be
31 Supra
32 Ibid.

note 1 at 2110.
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ignored, in determining the tax consequences to a person
as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a
tax benefit that would but for this section, result, directly
or indirectly, from an avoidance transaction.
Paragraph 245(5)(c) was employed by the Minister to
recharacterize the nature of the payment to the taxpayers. The
assessor did not choose to put the taxpayers fully in the position
they would have been if they had liquidated their shares; this would
have resulted in a dividend tax refund for Bee under section 129.
The taxpayers argued that this payment would have accrued to
them indirectly as shareholders of the company, and should have
been allowed. The Court, relying on paragraph 245(5)(d),
confirmed the original assessment on the grounds that section 129
had been given consideration by the assessor, and was rejected
pursuant to administrative discretion.
The appellants' section 129 argument is viable under the
proposed approach outlined in Figure 4, as this transaction would
have been diverted to the ambit of section 84(2) before reaching the
GAAR stage. In the Smythe case, a dividend credit was available
directly to the appellants qua shareholders, and was found by
Judson ]. to be applicable as a result of the reassessment:
There appears to be no doubt that the re-assessments
were made under s.81(1) of the Act on the basis that
there had been a winding-up, discontinuance or
reorganization of the old company .... These assessments
should be made under this section with the necessary
consequences of a tax credit under s.38(1).33
Although the credit available to the taxpayers in Smythe would
have accrued directly to the taxpayers under assessment (rather
than indirectly as a result of a refund to the corporation as in
McNichol), the Court recognizes the applicability of relieving
provlSlons to transactions reassessed under anti-avoidance
legislation.
The administrative discretion conferred upon Revenue Canada
to reassess transactions under the GAAR has been the source of much

33 Supra note 5 at 563.
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controversy.34 Revenue Canada has attempted to allay fears
regarding its power in this regard by funnelling all GAAR
reassessments through its Taxation Head Office. 35 Although this
may provide for a certain amount of consistency in the rule's
application, it has been said that the rule creates inherent
uncertainty. Krishna has described the power of the informal
committee set up to review the application of the GAAR as possessing
a unique brawn:
[T]his "informal committee" of Revenue Canada exerts
enormous administrative power. Although, in theory, the
power of this committee is neither greater nor less than
the power of the Rulings Division to "bless or kill"
proposed transactions, the committee exerts a far greater
influence in respect of GAAR. A Committee decision to
turn down a request for a GAAR ruling will have a chilling
effect on proposed transactions. The administrative
perception of what is "abusive" or "offensive" will
determine the disposition of most, if not all, proposed
transactions. The costs and delays involved in potential
litigation will be sufficient to thwart the administrator's
decision in most cases. 36

Howard Kellough describes this "chilling effect" as the "fear
factor," claiming that it is enhanced by public pronouncements such
as the following speech given by then Minister David Anderson:
You' re going to see a lot of professional people who've
been cheating in jail. That's what we're after. We're
going to audit and we're going to enforce, and I'm
telling our people I want prosecutions to the hilt .... I'm
really upset about the number of professions, in
particular, chartered accountants, lawyers, people who
should know, who have a professional responsibility to

34 See submissions by The Joint Commission on taxation of the C.BA and
C.I.C.A., reprinted as Appendix A.2 and A.8 in V. Krishna, Tax Avoidance: The
General Anti-Avoidance Rule, supra note 20.
35 Information Circular IC-88-2, "General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Section 245 of
the Income Tax Act" (21 October 1988).
36 Supra note 20 at 75-76.
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advise on tax matters effectively and they' re turning their
skills to the evasion of taxes. 37

Information Circular IC 88-2 and the supplement thereto
describe various situations where, in the opinion of Revenue
Canada, the GAAR will and will not apply to given transactions.3 8
These circulars are of limited value in predicting the situations in
which GAAR will be applied, since they are relevant only to the
specific fact situations contained in the circular. A further limitation
is that the circulars indicate only that the GAAR does or does not
apply to the transaction, without giving sufficient commentary on
how the rule is applied to the transactions.
In conducting the reassessment under the GAAR in McNichol,
it is unclear whether the Minister compared the transaction
undertaken by the taxpayer to what should have been done or
could have been done in effecting the distribution of the surplus of
Bee. This is a question of immense importance to the
recharacterization of transactions for the purposes of denying a tax
benefit. The recent Australian High Court decision in Spotless39 is
an example of such a recharacterization under the Australian general
anti-avoidance provision found in Part IVA of the Income Tax
Assessment Act, 1936 (Cth). The taxpayers in Spotless required a
short-term investment in which to deposit A$40 million. Both
domestic and off-shore possibilities were reviewed, with an offshore investment in the Cook Islands ending up as the vehicle of
choice. The interest rate for this investment was 4.5% lower than
that which could have been obtained in Australia, but the
combination of a low tax rate in the Cook Islands and the tax
exempt status of the income in Australia made the investment the
most attractive alternative. The Full Court found that the
transaction was a bona fide attempt to obtain the greatest amount of
37H. Kellough, "Tax Avoidance: 1945-1995" (1995) 43:5 Can. Tax J. 1819 at
1833-1834.
38 Information Circular IC 88-2, supra note 35; Information Circular IC 88-22
Supp. 1 "General Anti-Avoidance Rule" (13 July 1990).
39 Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v. Spotless
Services Ltd. (1995), 95 A.T.C. 4775 (Full F.C.); Commissioner of Taxation of the
Commonwealth ofAustralia v. Spotless Finance Pty Ltd (1996), 96 A.T.C. 5201
(Full H.C.).
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return on the taxpayers' investment. 40 The High Court overturned
this ruling of the Full Court, finding that the scheme gave rise to an
improper tax benefit under Part IVA.
For the purposes of this note, it is the method of
comparison used by the High Court to determine the benefit to the
taxpayers that is of importance. The taxpayers submitted that,
there is no possible way of knowing whether the amount
actually derived from the investment, or any other
particular amount, would have been included in the
assessable income of the taxpayers had they chosen not
to make the investment that they did. It is said that if
the taxpayers did not enter into the scheme, there would
have been no interest and no amount would have been
included in assessable income with the result that the
definition of "tax benefit" makes no sense in the context
of the present case.41

The Court rejected this argument, finding it sufficient that the
"amount in question might reasonably have been included in the
assessable income if the scheme had not been entered into or
carried out." 42 It determined the amount of the benefit to be the
amount equal to the interest earned on the investment less the
withholding tax paid in the Cook Islands. This figure is based on
the fact that the interest rate in Australia was not less than that
obtained in the Cook Islands, and that, when reasonably
considered, Australia was the likely place that the money would
otherwise be invested. The facts of the case reveal, however, that
there were other off-shore schemes rejected by the taxpayers in
favour of the Cook Islands transaction. One such scheme was put
forward by Rothschild Australia Ltd. to invest the money in Hong
Kong. Presuming that the appropriate tax clearing certificate could
be obtained for the investment, there is no reason to expect that it
would not have been the next best choice for the taxpayers. It is
suggested that making the default position a domestic investment
is unduly harsh, and will have a "chilling-effect" on taxpayers
considering legitimate off-shore transactions.
4o

Full F.C., ibid.

41 Full H.C., ibid. at para 41.
42

Ibid at para 45.
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The decision in Peabody, another recent Australian case, made a
somewhat more helpful statement regarding what would be an
appropriate base on which to determine the valuation of a "tax
benefit." 43 When considering the statement by the Commissioner
that the taxpayer might have been "reasonably expected" to follow
an alternate course of action the Court noted that:
A reasonable expectation requires more than a possibility.
It involves a prediction as to events which would have
taken place if the relevant scheme had not been entered
into or carried out and the prediction must be
sufficiently reliable for it to be regarded as reasonable. 44
Under subsection 245(2) of the Canadian rule, any tax benefit
can be denied as is "reasonable in the circumstances." The word
"reasonable" suggests an objective test, while "in the circumstances"
is likely to involve at least a modicum of consideration of the
subjective intent of the taxpayer. It is admitted that this subjective
evaluation will be difficult to accomplish in light of the guarded
stance likely to be taken by the taxpayer, but the consideration
should nonetheless be an important one. With regard to the
McNichol case, it is arguable that, in circumstances involving
another purchaser, the building may not have been sold prior to the
distribution of the shares. If Bee was not sold as a cash company,
but rather with the building as its only asset, it is unlikely that GAAR
would have been applied by the assessor. However, the "benefit" to
the taxpayers would have remained-a capital gain, rather than a
liquidating dividend, would still have accrued to the taxpayers.
The Court in McNichol stated that "[d]ifficulties may exist in
other cases in identifying the standard [against which a reduction in
tax is to be measured] but in this case there is no such difficulty." 45
Perhaps the Federal Court of Appeal will alleviate this dearth of
judicial guidance so that a final determination on the "tax benefit"
issue can be made. 46

43

FC ofT. v. Peabody (1994), 94 A.T.C. 4663 (Full H.C.).
Ibid. at para 31.
45 Supra note 1 at 2108.

44

46

An appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal has been filed.
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IV. CONCLUSION

If the

is to be effective in curbing tax avoidance, while
providing enough certainty for taxpayers to order their affairs, it is
necessary that a clear structure for its operation be devised.
McNichol v. The Queen, as the first judicial decision on the
application of the GAAR provided an opportunity to clearly define
the scope of the rule and set out how it should be used in practice.
Unfortunately, this opportunity was not put to use. Instead, the
decision in McNichol merely supports Revenue Canada's position
that the GAAR "applies to a transaction in which a shareholder
receives a capital gain instead of a dividend on the disposition of
property .... "47 By abandoning the application of a specific antiavoidance provision in favour of applying the GAAR, the ruling
further obfuscates the route that should be taken in administering
the rule.
This note suggests that the better approach, consistent with case
law and with the intention of the drafters of the legislation, is that
the presence of effective, specific anti-avoidance rules should
preclude the application of the GAAR. Such an approach would
provide increased balance between the need of Revenue Canada to
ensure the fair and neutral application of the Act, and those of the
taxpayer to structure transactions with certainty.

47

GAAR

A Santos, "GAAR Hits Surplus Stripping"(l997) 5:2 Canadian
Highlights at 9.
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